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MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISIONMAKING FOR
SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPED INFANTS: IS THERE
A ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT?
In 1982, a Down's Syndrome baby in Indiana focused public and governmental
attention on the problems involved in making treatment decisions for seriously handi-
capped infants.' This baby, known as Baby Doe, died after his parents decided not to
consent to surgery to correct his blocked esophagus. 2
 The public outcry over this case
led the U.S. Department of Health and .Human Services and ultimately Congress to seek
ways to ensure that medical treatment decisions are based only on the likelihood that
treatment will be medically beneficial rather than on subjective assessments of the quality
of life deemed possible for an infant who is likely to suffer from permanent disabilities. 3
Before this case, the parents and doctors of a disabled infant made these difficult
decisions regarding medical treatment primarily on their own. 4
 Although state child
protective services agencies and state courts protected infants from treatment decisions
which violated state homicide and neglect statutes, the federal government was not
involved. 5
 After 1982, however, the federal government decided that the existing frame-
work for decisionmaking had not worked in the Indiana Baby Doe case." Asa result,
the government sought, under two different federal statutes, to give the Department of
Health and Human Services (111 -1S) a role in infant treatment decisions.'
' See Ellums, Baby Doe: Problems and Legislative Proposals — Legislative Workshop, 1984 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 601, 601-02.
2 See R.F. WELK, SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN
NEONATAL MEDICINE, 128-29 (1984).
3 See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (1982 & Supp. 111
1985); 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1986) (Final Rules issued under Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982)). The Supreme Court invalidated portions of these Final Rules in Rowell v.
American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). See infra notes 117- 143 and accompanying text.
4 See R.F. WEIR, supra note 2, at 39. For a discussion of the incidence of parental decisions not
to treat and physician attitudes towards nontreatment, see Turnbull, Incidence of Infanticide in
America: Public and Professional Attitudes, 1 ISSUES IN L. & Men. 363 (1986). Alter emphasizing the
diversity of opinion among physicians and the difficulty of making generalizations, Professor
Turnbull concludes that public and professional attitudes "arc largely negative and incidence is
greater than reported." Id. at 383. Another survey of physician attitudes indicates that over 80%
of pediatric surgeons and pediatricians do not believe that "the life of each and every newborn
infant should be saved if it is within [their) ability to do so." Shaw, Randolph & Manard, Ethical
Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588,
589 (1977). Doctors at an Oklahoma hospital have been sued for allegedly using various nonmedical
criteria in determining how to treat infants horn with spina bifida. Johnson v, Sullivan, No. Civ,
85.2434 A (W.D. Okla., filed Oct. 3, 1985), described in 1 ISSUES IN L. & Men. 321, 321 (1986). In
determining how to treat infants born with spina bifida, the doctors considered nonmedical factors
including the financial and intellectual resources of the infant's family and the financial support
available from support agencies. Id. at 323.
5 See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns; A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rev.
213, 222, 233 (1975).
6 See 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1622-23 (1984).
7 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); Child Abuse prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (1982 & Stipp. III 1985).
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The federal government responded initially to the Baby Doe case by issuing and
amending a series of HHS regulations 8 under the authority of section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped in
federally funded programs. 9 The section 504 regulations generally empowered HHS
officials Co intervene directly in individual cases by conducting on-site investigations
when HHS received reports alleging that a handicapped infant was not receiving ap-
propriate medical care. 19 In addition, the regulations authorized HHS to recommend
that the U.S. Justice Department take action in individual cases where HHS deems it
necessary to ensure that an infant is not discriminatorily denied medical treatment."
In the 1986 case of Bowen v. American Hospital Association, the United States Supreme
Court struck down the section 504 regulations which gave HHS officials a role in
individual medical treatment decisions. 12 The Supreme Court in Bowen found that HHS
failed to establish that the incidence of discrimination against handicapped infants jus-
tified the intrusive federal agency involvement in medical treatment decisions contem-
plated by the section 504 regulations.'s The Court, however, did not decide whether
section 504 permitted any HHS involvement in these medical treatment decisions."
The federal government's second response to the Indiana Baby Doe case was to
amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1984.' 5 Congress amended
the definition of child neglect to include the "withholding of medically indicated treat-
ment" from seriously disabled infants."' The Child Abuse Amendments require states
to implement documented procedures to respond to reports of such medical neglect."
Congress also authorized HHS to issue regulations generally implementing the provisions
of these amendments.m
Despite the federal government's regulatory and legislative responses io the Indiana
Baby Doe case, its role in the process of making medical treatment decisions for seriously
handicapped infants has, in the final analysis, remained essentially unchanged. The
Supreme Court has declared that the federal government's efforts to involve itself in
8 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1986) (Final Rules issued Jan. 12, 1984); 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983)
(Proposed Rules, proposed July 5, 1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (Interim Final Rule, proposed
Mar. 7, 1983). 1.11-1S has the authority to issue regulations implementing the provisions of the
Rehabilitation Act. See S. Rio'. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6391.
9 29 U.S.C. $ 794 (1982). For the text of § 504, see infra note 54.
t° See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1986).
"45 C.F.R. §§ 80.8(2), 84.55(e) (1986). For a general discussion of the objections to the § 504
regulations, see Mathieu, The Baby Doe Controversy, 1984 /Utz. ST. L.J. 605, 607-11; Meyer, Protecting
the Best Interests of the Child: Is The State the Necessary Blunt Instrument?, 1984 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 627, 633-
35.
12 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2123 (1986).
19
	 id. at 2122.
" See id. at 2124-25 (White, J., dissenting).
19 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, originally passed in 1974, generally provides for federal grants to the states and
public and private organizations for the purpose of identifying, preventing, and treating child abuse
and neglect. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985).
' 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 5102(3) (Supp. III 1985).
' 7 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(K) (Supp. III 1985).
1 ' 42 U.S.C. § 5103 note (Supp. III 1985) (Procedures and Programs for Responding to Reports
of Medical Neglect).
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treatment decisions under section 504 are unwarranted.'" In addition, the Child Abuse
Amendments leave to the states the task of ensuring that treatment decisions are not
based on discriminatory considerations related to an infant's likely disabilities."
While the potential exists for further federal regulation under both statutory
schemes, the government has thus far refrained from further intrusion into the medical
decisionmaking process. Currently, the infant's parents and doctors still have primary
responsibility for deciding when to withhold treatment," although the Child Abuse
Amendments require state agencies to intervene if they receive a report that treatment
is being withheld wrongfully." The federal government thus seems to have recognized
that the problem of making treatment decisions for handicapped infants is not one which
is best resolved by federal government action, but rather is a matter best left to the more
flexible judgment of parents, doctors, and, in exceptional cases, state agencies."
This note will explore the changing role of the federal government in medical
treatment decisionmaking for handicapped infants. Section I will describe briefly the
framework in which treatment decisions were made prior to the recent federal responses
to the "Baby Doe" problem. 24 Section Il will discuss the HHS regulations promulgated
and amended under the nondiscrimination provisions of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, and how lower courts responded to those regulations." This section also will ex-
amine the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen a. American Hospital Association and its effect
on HHS's ability to regulate treatment decisions under section 504, 20 Section III will
describe the Child Abuse Amendments enacted by Congress and regulations issued
thereunder by HHS." Finally, section IV will analyze the role the federal government
could still play in medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants and conclude
that federal government involvement in the decisionmaking process is unwarranted."
I. REGULATION OF MEDICAL DECISIoNMAKING FOR INFANTS BEFORE 1982
Prior to the recent activity in the federal arena, no uniform law governed medical
treatment decisionmaking for handicapped infants and regulation of this process was
left to the states." Individual state homicide laws, and, in some states, child abuse and
neglect laws, provided some limitations within which parents and doctors made treatment
L" Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass's, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2123 (1986).
2° 42 U.S.G. §5103(b)(2)(K) (Supp. 111 1985).
21 See 50 Fed. Reg, 14,878, 14,880 (1985),
22 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(K) (Stipp. III 1985).
25 Fur a discussion of the advisability or regulating treatment decisions, compare Goldstein, Not
for Law to Approve or Disapprove — A Comment on Professor Mnookin's Paper, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 085,
691-92 (concluding that legislation is inappropriate because society does not agree on what treat-
ment decisions are "right" or "wrong") and Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An
Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 FIARV. J. ON 137, 150 (1983) (concluding that legislation
is needed to "establish a legal framework to guide the activities and the decisions of health care
personnel and others").
24 See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 54-116 and accompanying text..
211 See infra notes 117-59 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 160-87 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 188-235 and accompanying text.
" See generally Robertson, supra note 5, at 217-35.
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decisions." Yet despite the apparent applicability of these state laws, as several commen-
tators noted, whether a decision to withhold treatment from a handicapped infant would
result in civil or criminal liability for the parents or doctors was an open question."
The intentional killing of an infant clearly violates state homicide laws.32 A parent
or doctor who deliberately withholds or withdraws lifesaving medical care from an infant
for the purpose of causing the infant's death could be subject to criminal liability for
murder, as well as for violating state child abuse and neglect laws." Criminal sanctions,
however, are rarely, if ever, applied to parents or doctors who decide to withhold
treatment from severely handicapped newborns." In some cases states have instituted
neglect proceedings which result in courts ordering that a child be taken from his or
her parents for purposes of treatment." In general, however, most parental decisions
to withhold treatment are not challenged because parents and doctors make these
decisions privately and state prosecutors, even if informed, generally respect the difficult
nature of these decisions."
In the early 1970s, articles began to appear in medical journals publicizing the fact
that parents and doctors were withholding or withdrawing medical treatment from some
severely handicapped infants. 37 Nevertheless, parents and doctors continued to make
treatment decisions for severely handicapped infants privately, except in rare cases when
hospital personnel disagreed with a decision strongly enough to intitiate neglect pro-
ceedings." Despite the problem's increased exposure, no substantive change occurred
in doctor and parental discretion concerning treatment decisions for disabled infants
until nearly ten years later, when the Baby Doe case came to the public's attention and
sharply focused public debate and criticism on these medical treatment decisions."
Baby Doe was born in Bloomington, Indiana with Down's Syndrome and esophageal
airesia, a condition in which the esophagus is separated from the stomach and the result.
of which is that food cannot be taken orally:" Although this condition is surgically
"Id. (discussing criminal liability of parents and doctors under existing laWs). See also R.F.
WEIR, supra note 2, at 99.
3 ' See, e.g., R.F. WEnt, supra note 2, at 98.
32 Id. at 92.
33 See Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 ARIZ.. ST. L.J. 667, 668-69; Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die:
Who Decides?, 7 Ant. J.L. & MED. 393,402 (1982).
44 R.F. WruK, supra note 2, at 98. In fact, Weir asserts that no parent or doctor in this country
has ever been successfully prosecuted for neonatal euthanasia. Id.
3' Mnookin, supra note 33, at 670 & n.10. Professor Mnookin gives several examples, including
Weber a. Stony Brook Hospital, discussed infra at notes 89-91 and accompanying text, of cases where
states have become involved in parental nontreatment decisions through state child abuse and
neglect laws. Id. at 670 n.10.
3° See R.F. WEIR, supra note 2, at 101.
37 Mnookin, supra note 33, at 670 n.8. See, e.g., Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in
the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973) (reporting that 43 out of 299 consecutive
deaths of infants admitted to the special care nursery during 1970-72 resulted from decisions to
withhold treatment).
33 See Mnookin, supra note 33, at 670-71.
" See id. at 671-72. Weir explains that possible reasons for the infrequent prosecution of
parents and doctors who decide to withhold treatment from handicapped infants include the private
nature of the decision, general agreement among those involved about the action taken, and respect
for the parents' autonomy in making a very difficult decision. R.F. WEIR, supra note 2, at 100-02.
40
 R.F. WEIR, supra note 2, at 128 & 141 n.29 (describing the Indiana Baby Doe case).
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correctible, the doctors involved in this case disagreed about the operation's chance of
success. The parents decided not to consent to surgery or to intravenous feedings:"
The hospital administration brought suit seeking to overrule the parents' decision.
At an emergency hearing, the judge held that the parents had a right to withhold consent
to the surgery even though it meant that the child would die. 42 Although the county
welfare agency, appointed as the child's guardian ad litem, did not appeal the court's
decision, county prosecutors intervened and unsuccessfully sought to have the appeals
court take custody of the child•" The prosecutors then appealed to the Indiana Supreme
Court which refused to intervene:• Baby Doe died six clays after his birth while the
prosecutors were seeking a stay in the United States Supreme Court:*
The parents' decision in the Baby Doe case received a great deal of publicity and
criticism.4" Before this controversial case, parents and doctors generally made difficult
treatment decisions for seriously disabled infants without interference from government
agencics. 47 After the Baby Doe case, however, HHS promulgated a series of regulations
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act intended to regulate the decisionmaking
process regarding medical treatment for handicapped infants•th The Supreme Court
ultimately invalidated these regulations in its 1986 decision in Bowen v. American Hospital
Association. 49
I I. THE GOVERNMENT'S FIRST RESPONSE - THE REGULATIONS UNDER SECTION 504 OF
THE REHABILITATION ACT
A. NHS Regulations Issued Under Section 504 and Lower Court Responses
As a result of the publicity over the Baby Doe case, President Reagan issued a
memorandum directing the Secretary of HHS to remind health care providers that
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied to them." The Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 extended and amended the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. 5 As the name implies,
the Act is geared towards assisting the states, through federal grants, in providing
vocational rehabilitation programs to help handicapped individuals gain employment
and participate more fully in society. 52 Although in general the act focuses on providing
1 ' Id. Weir reports that sonic of the doctors involved believed the operation had an 85-90%
chance or success, while others believed the chance of success was 50-50. Id.
12 Id.
4 3 Id. at 128-29 (referring to In re Infant. Doe, No. CU 8204.004A (Monroe County Ci•. Ct..,
Apr. 12, 1982), cited in Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2108 n.5 (1986)).
44 Id. (referring to State ex rd. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S 140 (May 27, 1982), cited in
Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2108 n.5),
15 Id. at 129. Certiorari was denied. Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
1" See Mnookin, supra note 33, at 671-72.
' 7 See id. at 669-70.
48 See 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984).
49
 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2123 (1986).
5° 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1982).
• 1
 29 U.S.C. § 790 (1982).
152
 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ansurr.
NEWS 2076, 2092. See also 29 U.S.C. 701 (1982), which contains die following "congressional
declaration of purpose": "The purpose of this chapter is to develop and implement, through
720	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 29:715
vocational training to the handicapped, the act also establishes groups to study architec-
tural and transportation barriers impeding the handicapped, and to monitor the federal
government's progress in hiring and placement of handicapped individuals." Section
504, the act's last section, makes it unlawful for programs or activities that receive federal
funding to discriminate against an otherwise qualified handicapped individual solely
because of the individual's handicap." Under section 504, the federal government's
executive agencies are authorized to issue regulations prohibiting discrimination against
handicapped individuals in federally funded programs." Thus, section 504 provides a
mechanism for the federal government to institute procedures to eliminate handicap
discrimination in federally funded programs. 56
In May of 1982, the Secretary of HHS responded to the Indiana Baby Doe case
and the President's memorandum by sending a notice to 7,000 health care providers
reminding them that section 504 applied to medical treatment decisions involving hand-
icapped infants.57 In March of 1983, the Secretary published an Interim Final Rule (the
"Interim Rule") which required hospitals to post in a conspicuous place a , notice titled:
"DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDICAPPED IN-
FANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW." 58 The Interim
Rule established a confidential "Handicapped Infant Hotline" for persons who wished
to report suspected discriminatory treatment of handicapped infants, and provided for
immediate HHS on-site investigations, including access to medical records, parents, and
doctors, when HHS officials believed it necessary to protect a handicapped infant. 56
research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated
programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living."
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 792 (1982).	 •
"See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 provides: "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of his [or her] handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ." Id.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) defines handicapped individual as "any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii)
has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment"
5s
	 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
" S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6373, 6390.
" 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1622-23 (1984). The notice stated:
Under section 504, it is unlawful for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to
withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical
treatment required to correct a life-threatening condition, if:
(1) The withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped;
(2) The handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medi-
cally contraindicated.
47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982). The notice also recommended that "[h]ealth care providers should not
aid a decision by the infant's parents or guardian to withhold treatment or nourishment discrimi-
natorily by allowing the infant to remain in the institution." Id.
HHS later changed its position on this latter point, stating that "a recipient hospital may not
blindly implement improper and discriminatory parental decisions. Rather, the hospital should
resort to the system provided by state law to determine whether a parental decision should be
implemented." 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1631 (1984).
"48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631 (1983) (proposed Mar. 7, 1983).
59 Id. at 9630-31.
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Shortly after its publication, a group of children's medical organizations challenged
the Interim Rule, alleging, among other things, that the regulation was issued in violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA's) notice requirements. 6" In American Academy
if Pediatrics v. Heckler, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia struck
clown the Interim Rule." The court found that the Interim Rule violated the APA in
two respects: first, it was arbitrary and capricious because HHS ignored several important
factors involved in medical treatment decisionmaking; 62 and second, it violated the
specific APA procedural requirements for a public comment periods' and publication of
the regulation at least thirty days before its effective dates'
The court found that the Interim Rule failed to satisfy the APA's substantive re-
quirements in that HHS failed to present evidence that it considered several critical
factors involved in applying section 504 to medical treatment decisions for handicapped
infants.65 The court noted HHS's failure to consider the disruption of hospital routine
and infant care that the Handicapped Infant Hotline and the so-called "Baby Doe
squads" would cause in hospital nurseries.'" While the regulations encouraged doctors
to think in terms of the medical risks and benefits to the handicapped infant, the court
was concerned that the regulations did not give sufficient consideration to the parents'
wishes, commenting that it is the parents who know what decision will be in their child's
best interests. 67
The court further criticized HEIS's failure to consider the proper course of treatment
in futile cases, failure to consider other ways to protect handicapped infants, failure to
consider the proper scope of section 504, and failure to show that the problem is of
sufficient magnitude to warrant the proposed regulation: 68 The court also faulted the
text of the rule, citing particularly the provision that it is unlawful to deny to a handi-
capped infant "customary medical care." 6" On reviewing the evidence submitted, the
court found that no customary standard of medical care existed for treating severely
handicapped infants, and, therefore, the regulation was meaningless "beyond its intrinsic
in lerrore• effect." 70
In addition to finding that HHS violated the APA in failing to consider all relevant
factors, the court found that HHS failed to meet the APA's procedural requirements
because it did not provide the required public comment period or publish the regulation
at least thirty days before its effective date." Because the Interim Rule proposed sub-
stantial changes in the process of medical treatment decisionmaking, the court found
as American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Stipp. 395, 396 (D.D.C. 1983). The
plaintiffs also argued that the regulation unconstitutionally invaded the parents' and doctors' privacy
rights, and that 111-IS did not have statutory authority to issue the regulations. Id.
"I Id. at 403.
62 Id. at 308-99 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)).
63 Id. at 400 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982)).
64 Id. (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1982)).
65 Id. at 399.
"" Id.
Id. at 400.
as Id.
fig Id. (citing Interim Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631 (1983)).
"Id.
71 Id.
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that it was not a mere procedural or interpretive rule. 72 Instead, the court found, the
Interim Rule affected substantive rights and therefore was subject to the APA's comment
and delayed effective date requirements." The court dismissed HHS's argument that
the APA's procedural requirements should be waived in order to save infant lives, finding
no evidence of an emergency that justified waiving the public comment period."
Because it determined that the Interim Rule was invalid under the APA, the court
did not decide the issue of section 504's general applicability to medical treatment of
seriously handicapped newborns." In dicta, however, the court observed that although
the legislative history does not evidence a specific congressional intent to apply section
504 to sensitive medical treatment decisions for handicapped newborns, the language is
similar to that of other civil rights statutes which have been applied broadly to fight
racial discrimination." The court therefore speculated that section 504 might authorize
some regulation of medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants,” but noted
that a specific case would provide a better basis for determining the statute's proper
scope."
After the American Academy of Pediatrics decision, H HS issued and requested comment
on a new Proposed Rule." This Proposed Rule contained a slightly revised notice
requirement and an added provision requiring federally funded state child protective
services agencies to use their authority under state law to fight discrimination against
handicapped infants." H HS gave several examples of treatment decisions that would
violate section 504, including, for example, denying treatment to a child with spina bifida
when the denial is based on the likelihood that the child will suffer mental impairment,
paralysis, or incontinence throughout his or her life.'" After the Proposed Rule was
issued, a case involving facts similar to the HHS example entered the public spotlight
.
and eventually led to two lawsuits."
72 Id. at 401.
7' Id. One purpose of the APA, the court noted, is to ensure rational consideration of the
potential impact of regulatory action by allowing persons the opportunity to comment on proposed
regulations. Id. at 398-99.
74 Id. at 401.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 401-02.
" See id. at 402. The court stated, however:
It has been suggested by amid that the rule requires doctors and parents to undertake
heroic measures to preserve for as long as possible, despite expense and a prognosis
of certain death within months, the life of an anacephalic [sic] infant lacking all or
part of the brain and with no hope of ever achieving even the most rudimentary form
of consciousness.
Many would argue that had Congress intended section 504 to reach so far into
such a sensitive area of moral and ethical concerns it would have given some evidence
of that intent.
Id.
" Id. The plaintiffs also argued that the § 504 regulations invaded various constitutional rights,
Id. at 402-03. The court found that resolution of the constitutional issues was better left to specific
cases in which the regulations had been applied to individual plaintiffs. Id. at 403.
79 See 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (proposed July 5, 1983).
9° Id. at 30,851.
" Id. at 30,852.
" See United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984); Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (per curiam), aff'd
per curiam on other grounds, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983).
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On December 11, 1983, Baby Jane Doe was born in New York with spina bifida"
and other serious complications." Her parents decided not to consent to surgery that
would close the lesion in her back and correct her hydrocephalus, and decided instead
to treat her condition with antibiotic therapy." Their decision was challenged first by a
person unrelated to Baby Jane Doe or her family," and later by the United States
government acting on an anonymous telephone call to the HHS hotline alleging that
the hospital was discriminating against Baby Jane Doe based on her handicap. 87
In the first action, a Vermont attorney named A. Lawrence Washburn challenged
the parents' decision by petitioning the court to appoint a guardian ad kern for Baby
Jane Doe." The Supreme Court of Suffolk County initially appointed a guardian ad
litem and authorized -him to consent. to surgery to preserve Baby Jane Doe's life, but the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed this decision the next day." The
Appellate Division found no cause to interfere with the parents' informed choice of one
reasonable course of medical treatment over another for their daughter."" The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed and emphasized that it found no basis for interfering
when the party challenging the parents' decision had no relationship with any of the
concerned panics and apparently did not notify the New York Department of Social
Services of Baby Jane Doe's supposed neglect.•'
Weir defines spina bifida as most commonly involving:
an opening in the	 back that exposes both membrane tissue and nerve tissue and
often leaks cerebrospinal fluid. Caused by the failure of the neural tube to close during
the first trimester of pregnancy spina bifida with meningomyeloccle differs in its
severity depending on the size of the lesion, the location of the defect along the spinal
column, and the associated congenital anomalies present (hydrocephalus, neurological
dysfunction, sensory loss below the lesion, paralysis or muscle weakness below the
defect, incontinence of bowel and bladder).
R.F. WEIR, supra note 2, at 43.
" Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686. The court described Baby Jane Doe's other
medical problems as including "microcephaly, a small head circumference, bespeaking increased
pressure in the cranial cavity, and hydrocephalus, a condition in which fluid fails to drain from the
cranial areas." Id.
' 5 Id. at 588-89, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
86
 Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
" University Hasp., 729 1 7.2d at 147.
" See id. at 146.
" Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2(1 at 686. See also University Hosp., 729 F.2c1 at 147.
t"' Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N,Y.S.2c1 at 687. The court specifically found:
ITlhe failure to perform the surgery will not place the infant in imminent danger of
death, although surgery might. significantly reduce the risk of infection. On the other
hand, successful results could also be achieved with antibiotic therapy. Further, while
the mortality rate is higher where conservative medical treatment is used, in this
particular case the surgical procedures also involved a great risk of depriving the
infant of what little function remains in her legs, and would also result in recurring
urinary tract and possibly kidney infections, skin infections and edemas of the limbs.
It is manifest, therefore, that this is not a case where an infant is being deprived
.	 of medical treatment to achieve :3 quick and supposedly merciful death.
Id., 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87. -
'I'here are instances, however, where courts do not find the parents' decision to be reasonable.
See, e,g., Matter of Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967-68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.. 1979)
(court granted petition to appoint guardian to consent to surgery for infant with spina bifida whose
parents had refused consent "without justification").
Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 212-13, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65. The Court of Appeals
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During these state court proceedings, HHS received a complaint alleging that doc-
tors were denying Baby Jane Doe medical treatment because of her handicap. 92 The
government brought suit in federal district court under section 504 and the HHS
regulations promulgated thereunder when the hospital, at the parents' behest, refused
to release the infant's medical records to HHS." The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York held, in United Stales v. University Hospital, that although
Medicare and Medicaid payments do constitute federal financial assistance and thus
subject the hospital to section 504's prohibitions," the hospital had not in fact violated
section 504." Because the court found that the hospital's failure to perform the surgery
on Baby Jane Doe was based solely on the parents' refusal to consent, and the hospital
could not legally operate without this consent, the court concluded that the hospital had
not discriminated against Baby Jane Doe based on her handicap. 96 The court further
noted that the parents' decision to refuse consent was reasonable and in the child's best
interests; in following the parents' decision, therefore, the hospital's actions could not
violate section 504."
found that the petitioner had not complied with the New York Family Court Act, which provided
that child protective proceedings could be brought only by a child protective agency or by a person
appointed by a court. Id. at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1032). The court expressed its disapproval of' the entire matter:
There are overtones to this proceeding which we find distressing. Confronted with
the anguish of the birth of a child with severe physical disorders, these parents, in
consequence of judicial procedures for which there is no precedent or authority, have
been subjected in the last two weeks to Litigation through all three levels of our State's
court system. We find no justification for resort to or entertainment of these proceed-
ings.
Id. at 213, 456 N.E,2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
University Hosp., 575 F, Supp. at 611.
" Id. The regulations which HMS relied on in this case were not the new Proposed Rules issued
after the Indiana Bally Doe case, as they had not yet become effective. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d
at 146. The regulations involved in this case required that recipients of federal financial assistance
allow NHS officials access, during normal business hours, to such records as HHS deemed necessary
to determine that the recipient was in compliance with section 504. See id. at 147-48 (citing 45
C.F.R. § 84.61 (1982)).
g4 575 F. Supp. 607, 612 (EA/N.Y. 1983). The courts have not fully addressed the issue of
whether hospitals are recipients or federal financial assistance within the meaning of § 504. Although
the court here decided that Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements do constitute federal financial
assistance, other courts that have examined the issue in this context have not reached any conclu-
sions. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2111 n.9 (1986) (Court had "no reason
to review" the issue); University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 151 (court "bypassed" the issue "Ii]n the interest
of justice"); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Stipp. 395, 403 n.8 (1983) (court
found it was not necessary to reach this issue).
"5 University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 614.
96 Id.
" Id. at 614-15. The court relied on hot h the state court findings in this case, and the decision
of the New York State Child Protection Service, to whom 1.11-1S initially referred the complaint,
which supported the parents' decision. Id. at 615.
The court commented in dicta that the argument based on the parents' constitutional right to
privacy was an "extremely weak" one where the government had reason to believe that the parents
were nut acting in the best interests of the handicapped infant, and where the records were
confidential. Id, at 615-16. The court noted that the language, legislative history, and judicial
interpretation of § 504 all indicated that it was not intended to authorize federal government
involvement in the choice between reasonable medical alternatives, although the court found it
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
University Hospital decision. 98 In contrast to the district court's holding, however, the
Second Circuit determined that section 504 did not apply to medical treatment decisions
For handicapped infants. 99 The court reasoned that neither section 504's language nor
its legislative history indicated a congressional intention to get involved in decisions
which had traditionally been regulated by the states. 1 °° In determining whether Congress
intended section 504 to apply in this area, the Second Circuit first examined the evolution
of H HS's current view that Congress did intend section 504 to apply to medical treatment
decisions for handicapped infants. 1 ° 1 The court noted that, from 1976 through the recent
issuance of the Final Rules, HHS's view of whether section 504 authorized investigating
these decisions had changed considerably. 192 The court therefore found that it could not
rely on HHS's "longstanding, consistent interpretation" of section 504 for guidance."
The court next examined section 504's language and found that although Baby Jane
Doe was a "handicapped individual," she was not "otherwise qualified" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 1 04 The court reasoned that section 504 only prohibits discrimination
where the individual's handicap is not a proper consideration because the individual is
qualified in spite of his or her handicap." In the context of medical treatment decisions,
however, the court emphasized the difficulty of separating the handicap from the re-
sulting need for medical services, and, therefore, determined that it was appropriate to
consider the infant's handicaps in deciding on a course of medical treatment. 10° Thus,
section 504's prohibition against discrimination could not be applied meaningfully to a
medical treatment decision for an infant, with multiple birth defects, the court explained,
because the infant's medical problems are likely to be interrelated and because, in the
"fluid context" of medical treatment decisions, it would be difficult to determine whether
any given medical judgment was bona fide or discriminatory. 117 The court further
"quite possible" that § 504 authorized federal challenges to unreasonable choices. Id. at 616. For a
discussion of possible constitutional arguments in this area, see Bopp, Jr., Protection of Disabled
Newborns; Are There Constitutional Limitations?, 1 iSSUES IN L. & MED. 173 (1985). Bopp concludes:
"Inlone of the asserted constitutional rights would prevent the government from acting to protect
handicapped infants denied beneficial medical care necessary to treat a life-threatening condition."
Id. at 199-200.
98 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
" Id.
100 id. at 160.
1 ° 1 See id. at 151-54. Although the court discussed HHS's Final Rules issued on January 12,
1984, the court did not apply the Rules because they were issued after this litigation commenced.
See id. at 154. See supra note 93 for the regulations the court applied in this case.
102 Id. at 157. The court found that the Department of Health, Education and•Welfare — the
predecessor to 11 KS — had emphasized making services equally available to handicapped individuals
in its initial § 504 regulations. Id. at 152. The court noted that "IiIt was not until live years later
that 1-11•1S first took the position that section 504 made it unlawful for hospitals receiving 'Federal
financial assistance' to withhold nutrition, or medical, or surgical treatment from handicapped
infants if required to correct a life-threatening condition." Id.
'°1 Id. at 154.
104 Id. at 156.
'°5 Id. at 156-57 (citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 1 7.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981)).
11G See id,
1 °' See id. at 156-57. The court found:
Mhe phrase cannot be applied in the comparatively fluid context of medical treatment.
decisions without distorting its plain meaning. In common parlance, one would not
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reasoned that Congress would have spoken more clearly to this issue if it had intended
section 504 to apply to these decisions." After reviewing section 504's legislative history
and commenting on the federal government's traditional reluctance to get involved in
medical treatment decisions, the court concluded that Congress had not intended section
504 to impose a duty on the defendant hospital either to perform the surgery without.
the parents' consent or to attempt through the state court system to circumvent the
parents' decision.i°
Writing in dissent, Judge Winter stated that the lack of legislative history specifically
addressing section 504's application to medical treatment decisions for handicapped
infants did not overcome the plain language of the statute."" The dissent emphasized
that the statute's language purposefully mirrored the broad antidiscrimination language
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 111 The dissent argued, therefore, that Congress intended
to establish a broad policy prohibiting discrimination based on handicap just as it had
for discrimination based (in race and that it was appropriate to examine whether a given
medical judgment was made because of an infant's handicap. 12 While conceding the
possibility that handicap is not fully analogous to race, the dissent argued that the courts
should not question the reasonableness of Congress's decision to draw that analogy." 3
Additionally, the dissent characterized the majority's reading of section 504 as am-
biguous. The majority holding, the dissent argued, could be read either to prohibit
section 504's application to all medical treatment decisions or only to treatment decisions
involving certain "kinds" of handicapped persons." 4 Determining the statute's proper
scope on a case-by-case basis, as the majority now requires, the dissent argued, leads to
ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering from multiple birth defects as being
"otherwise qualified" to have corrective surgery performed or to have a hospital initiate
litigation seeking to override a decision against surgery by the infant's parents. If
congress intended section 504 to apply in this manner, it chose strange language
indeed .
. Where the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated,
it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was
"discriminatory."
Id. at 156-57.
1001d. at 157.
mg Li at 157-60.
110 Id. at 161 (Winter, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting) (citing S. R&, No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6373, 6390). Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
112 University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 162 (Winter, j., dissenting). The dissenting judge illustrated this
point with an example:
A judgment not to perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a bona fide
medical judgment. So too, a decision not to correct a fife threatening digestive problem
because an infant has Down's Syndrome is not a bona fide medical judgment. The issue
of parental authority is also quickly disposed of. A denial of medical treatment to an
infant because the infant is black is not legitimated by parental consent.
Id.
IIS Id. (Winter, j., dissenting).
114
 Id, at 162-63 (Winter, j,, dissenting).
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the same intrusive Federal inquiry into the facts of individual cases that the majority
claimed Congress never intended. 115
In summary, over a year after Baby Jane Doe was born, the Second Circuit. finally
settled the controversy concerning her parents' decision not to consent to surgery. The
court. found that federal government involvement under section 504 was nut warranted
in this particular case.° In the University Hospital decision, in contrast, the court left
unanswered the general question of federal involvement in treatment decisions under
section 504, as well as the question of the validity of H HS's Final Rules.
B. The Government's Section 504 Response Invalidated — The Bowen Decision
In Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 1 " 7
 a plurality of the United States Supreme
Court invalidated portions of the section 504 Final Rules relating to medical treatment
decisions for handicapped infants. 118 In Bowen, various medical organizations brought
suit to determine whether section 504 properly authorized these regulations.''" The
Court found that the administrative record failed to show a need for such federal
intervention under section 504. 1 '"
The Bowen plurality examined only the four provisions of H HS's Final Rules which
required health care providers to take certain actions under section 504. 151 These four
mandatory sections required that: (1) recipients of federal financial assistance post, in a
115 Id. at 163 (Winter, J„ dissenting).
116 Id. at 161.
III 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
Id. at 2123. The Filial Rules which the Bowen Colin invalidated were those issued by HIIS
in January 12, 1984 during the University Hospital litigation. See supra note 101.
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined in the plurality opinion by Justice Stevens. Id.
at 2105. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without opinion. Id. at 2123 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Three Justices dissented and Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision. Id.
"9 Id. at 2105 & n.2. The Bowen case consolidated two actions, one filed by the American
Hospital Association after HI-IS issued the Interim Rules, and one filed by the American Medical
Association after HE-IS issued the Final Rules. See id. at 2108, 2109. The district court, basing its
decision on the court or appeals decision in University Hospital, found that the regulations were not
authorized by § 504. American Hosp. Ass'n v, Heckler, 585 F. Stipp. 541, 592 (1984) (citing
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982)). The section of the APA cited by the
Heckler court provides that reviewing courts shall "(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be —
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right .. .."
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without opinion based on
its own opinion in University Hospital. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, No. 84-1529 (2d Cir. Dec,
27, 1984). See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2124 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). Although the government did
not appeal the University Hospital decision, that decision forms the basis for the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowen. See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2111.
' 2 " Bowen, I Or) S. Ct. at 2117.
' 21 Id. at 2111. In addition to the four mandatory provisions, the Final Rules contained non-
mandatory sections recommending that health care providers establish Infant Care Review Com-
mittees (1CRCs) and describing a Model ICRC to help "in the development of standards, policies
and procedures for providing treatment to handicapped infants." Id. §§ 84.55(a), (f).
An Appendix to the Final Rules contained 1.1 HS's interpretative guidelines for applying § 504
to health care decisions for handicapped infants and guidelines that describe how H HS should
investigate § 504 complaints. Id. pt. 84, app. C.
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place accessible to medical personnel, an informational notice indicating that section 504
prohibited discrimination against handicapped infants and containing telephone num-
bers for HHS and state child protective services agencies; 122
 (2) state child protective
services agencies implement procedures to prevent discriminatory medical treatment of
handicapped infants; 122
 (3) federal assistance recipients give HHS officials round-the-
clock access to their records and facilities when HHS deemed it necessary in order to
protect a handicapped infant: 124
 and (4) HHS be permitted to initiate court action to
effect compliance without prior notice to recipient hospitals when HHS deemed it
necessary.I 25
In examining whether section 504 authorizes the federal government to intervene
in treatment decisions as contemplated by the Final Rules, the Bowen plurality determined
that the agency must show a factual basis supporting the need for federal regulation. 126
The plurality emphasized that such treatment decisions had in the past been considered
matters governed by parental authority, except in extreme cases when state law could
be invoked to protect an infant. 127
 Furthermore, the plurality reasoned, because Con-
gress, when it enacted section 504, did not indicate an intent to involve the federal
government in medical treatment decisions which state law governed in the past, HHS
must "clearly" show that federal intervention was justified)"
' 22
 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b) (1986). Although 1-11-IS originally required that the notice be placed at
nurses' stations where parents might see it, 141-1S changed this requirement in response to critical
comments which suggested that the notice would upset parents. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1626 (1984).
122 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(c) (1986).
12 " 1 Id. § 84.55(d).
1 " Id. § 84.55(e).
:26 Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2113. The plurality stated:
Our recognition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power
to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries
with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual
basis for its decision, even though we show respect for the agency's judgment in both.
Id. Although the plurality opinion does not specifically mention the Administrative Procedure Act
section relied on by the district court. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982), the Court's general discussion
of administrative law principles, as well as the cases cited, demonstrate that the plurality interpreted
the Final Rules under 5 U.S.C. § 706. See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
' 27 Id. at 2113. The plurality quoted from the report of the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in describing the
pattern of decisionmaking for handicapped infants:
First, there is a presumption, strong but rebuttable, that parents are the appropriate
decisionmakers for their infants. "traditional law concerning the family, buttressed by
the emerging constitutional right of privacy, protects a substantial range of discretion
for parents. Second, as persons unable to protect themselves, infants fall under the
parens patriae power of the state. In the exercise of this authority, the state not only
punishes parents whose conduct has amounted to abuse or neglect of their children
but may also supervene parental decisions before they become operative to ensure
that the choices made are not so detrimental to a child's interests as to amount to
neglect and abuse.
... [Ms long as parents choose from professionally accepted treatment options
the choice is rarely reviewed in court and even less frequently supervened.
Id. at 2113 n, 13 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL.
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL. AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: DECIDING TO FOREGO 'LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 212-13 (1983)).
128 Id. at 2121-22 (quoting Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 211-12 (1931)).
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The plurality considered the two possible section 504 violations that H HS indicated
justified federal involvement in this area: first, where a hospital withholds medically
beneficial treatment solely because of an infant's handicap even where the parents have
consented to treatment; and second, where a hospital fails to report possible medical
neglect to state child protective services agencies when parents refuse consent for treat-
ment of a handicapped infant.129 The plurality found that HHS had failed to demon-
strate that either problem justified the federal intervention envisioned by the Final
Rules."u
The plurality dismissed HHS's first justification for federal involvement because of
a lack of evidence that hospitals ever refuse to treat infants when parents have given
their consent.'" Where the parents do consent to treatment and the hospital refuses to
treat their child, the plurality found, the parents themselves would contact appropriate
authorities. Thus, the plurality determined that federal intervention under the Final
Rules is unnecessary in cases where the parents consent to treatment. 12
In those cases where the parents withhold consent to treatment, the plurality found
that the infant is not "otherwise qualified" and thus, the hospital that complies with the
parents' decision has not denied the. infant treatment "solely by reason of his handicap"
within the meaning of section 504. 1 " The plurality was not persuaded by the govern-
ment's Civil Rights Act analogy and stated that, in the case of either a black or a
handicapped infant, when the parents have refused consent, a hospital's decision not to
treat cannot be discriminatory no matter what motivates the parental decision.'" The
plurality therefore found that cases involving parental nonconsent to treatment do not
provide the necessary factual support for federal intervention under section 504. 1 "
The plurality also found no factual support for H HS's second argument that hos-
pitals do not report to state agencies cases of parental refusal to consent to treatment
for their handicapped infants." The plurality noted that a hospital's failure to report a
parental decision not to treat a handicapped infant would violate section 504 only if' the
hospital would report the decision in the case of a similarly-situated nonhandicapped
infant.'" The plurality observed, however, that a hospital's failure to report nontreat-
tnent decisions for both handicapped and nonhandicapped infants does not violate
section 504's nondiscrimination principle.'" Because HHS did not demonstrate that
In Id. at 2113. The plurality limited its discussion to these two bases for intervention under
§ 504 because "an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency
itself." Id. at 2121 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v, State Farm Mut., 163 U.S. 29, 51) (1983)).
133 1d. at 2 - 117, 2118.
131 Id. at 2 - 115.
13 ' Id. The plurality was riot persuaded by the dissent's theory that the regulations address the
problem of discriminatory advice given by doctors to parents in the process of making treatment
decisions. See id. at 2117 n.22. The plurality found that the regulations are not directed to Ilre
advice which physicians can give in parents. Id. Moreover, because § 504 does 1101 apply to parental
decisions not to treat, the plurality observed that § 504 cannot prohibit "the giving of advice to do
something which * 504 does not itself prohibit." Id, The plurality suggested that such a prohibition
might violate the constitutional doctrine of free speech.
133 M. at 2114.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2116.
136 /d, at 2118.
' 37 Id, at 2118 0.23.
'" Id. at 2118. The plurality noted, however, that failure to report medical neglect might violate
state law reporting obligations. Id.
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hospitals discriminatorily observed their reporting obligations, therefore, the plurality
found that HHS had not justified federal intervention under section 504) 39
Lastly, the plurality criticized the Final Rules' requirement that state agencies use
their full authority under state law to prevent discriminatory medical neglect of handi-
capped infants.'" The plurality found unjustifiable the Final Rules' imposition of an
"absolute obligation" on state agencies to investigate reports of medical neglect of hand-
icapped infants when the Final Rules imposed no similar requirement on the level of
services provided to nonhandicapped infants."' In the plurality's view, section 504 only
authorizes HHS to require state agencies to make the same services available to handi-
capped infants as are available to similarly situated nonhandicapped infants. Thus, the
plurality concluded that section 504, with its focus on equality of treatment between
handicapped and nonhandicapped individuals, did not authorize HHS to impose such
an "affirmative-action obligation" on state agencies with regard to handicapped infants. 12
In fact, the plurality noted, HHS seemed more concerned with ensuring that handi-
capped infants receive life-saving medical treatment than with applying section 504's
principle of equal treatment for both handicapped and nonhandicapped individuals."'
The dissent in Bowen criticized the plurality's narrow focus on the validity of the
Final Rules' four mandatory provisions) ." The dissent argued that the Court should
have decided the more fundamental question left open by University Hospital of whether
section 504 authorizes HHS to regulate medical treatment decisions for handicapped
infants in any way."' Whereas the University Hospital court struck down the section 504
regulations, the dissent would have found that handicapped infants with multiple birth
defects can be "otherwise qualified" to receive medical treatment. 146
The dissent reasoned that section 504's "otherwise qualified" language on which the
University Hospital court relied, did not necessarily prevent section 504's application to
treatment decisions regarding handicapped infants."' Where an infant has a medically
correctable condition which is unrelated to his or her handicap, the dissent argued, the
infant would be "otherwise qualified" to receive medical treatment." 6 The dissent thus
1'9
	 In contrast to HHS's contentions, the plurality observed that in both the Indiana Baby
Doe case and the Baby Jane Doe case, the hospitals had initiated proceedings in the courts to
override the parents' decisions. Id. at 2118 n.24.
Id. at 2119 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(c)( I) (1985)).
141 Id. at 2120.
142 Id. at 2119 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979)).
14 " Id. at 2123. The plurality commented that IsJection 504 does not authorize [HHS) to give
unsolicited advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to state officials who are faced with difficult
treatment decisions concerning handicapped children." Id.
144 Id. at 2124 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Justice White's dissent, and Justice
O'Connor joined in all but one section. Id. at 2123 (White, J., dissenting). See infra note 150 and
accompanying text explaining the section Justice O'Connor did not join.
145 Id. at 2124-25 (White, J., dissenting).
' 4 " Id. at 2127 (White, J., dissenting).
147 Id.
14 , Id. Justice White illustrated this point with an example:
An esophageal obstruction, for example, would not be part and parcel of the handicap
of a baby suffering from Down's Syndrome, and the infant would benefit from and is
thus otherwise qualified for having the obstruction removed in spite of the handi-
cap....
It would not be difficult to multiply examples like this. And even if it is true that
in the great majority of cases the handicap itself will constitute the need for treatment,
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concluded that the University Hospital court's holding that section 504 may never apply
to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants was incorrect.'"
The dissent also addressed the plurality's finding that HHS failed to support fac-
tually a need for the regulations under section 504, 1 " The dissent criticized the plurality
for examining only two instances in which discrimination that violates section 504 could
occur, that is, when a hospital refuses to treat an infant whose parents have consented
to treatment, or when a hospital, solely because of an infant's handicap, does not report
to appropriate state agencies a case of parental nonconsent.''' Citing the medical studies
on which HHS relied, the dissent contended that there is evidence that handicapped
infants are discriminatorily denied medical treatment and suggested that physician and
hospital attitudes might discriminatorily influence parental decisions. 152 Thus, the dissent
concluded that these general studies provided the factual support for HHS's intervention
under section 504.
Lastly, the dissent criticized the plurality for failing to delineate clearly what authority
1-11-IS does have under section 504. 153 On the one hand, the dissent pointed out, the
plurality purported to limit itself only to an evaluation of the four mandatory regula-
tions.'" On the other hand, the dissent observed, the plurality seemed to conclude that
HHS could not issue other regulations similar to those found invalid in this case, thus
implying that HHS could not regulate treatment decisions for handicapped infants at
all under section 504. In short, the dissent concluded, the plurality opinion "gives no
guidance to the Secretary or the other parties as to the proper construction of the
governing statute, and fails to explain adequately the precise scope of the holding or
how that holding is supported under the plurality's chosen rationale." 155
In conclusion, a plurality of the Court in Bowen invalidated those portions of HHS's
section 504 regulations which authorized federal intervention in individual treatment
decisions where HHS deemed the life of a handicapped infant to be in danger.156 The
plurality found that HI-IS had failed to demonstrate the need for such intrusive federal
intervention in an area previously governed by parental discretion and, in extreme cases,
state law.'" The dissent criticized the plurality's narrow focus on the validity of only the
I doubt that this consideration or any other mentioned by the Court of Appeals justifies
the wholesale conclusion that § 504 never applies to newborn infants with handicaps.
That some or most failures to treat may not fall within § 504, that discerning which
failures to treat are discriminatory may be difficult, and that applying § 504 in this
area may intrude into the traditional functions of the State do not support the cate-
gorical conclusion that the section may never be applied to medical decisions about
handicapped infants.
Id.
149 Id. at 2127-28 (White, J., dissenting). Having determined that University Hospital was wrongly
decided, the dissent would have remanded to the court of appeals for determination of the scope
of 1-11-4S's authority under section 504. Id. at 2128 (White, J., dissenting).
u'o Id, at 2128-31 (White, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did not join in this section of the
dissent because she found "no need at this juncture to address the details of the regulations .. .."
Id. at 2132 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 /d. at 2128 (White, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 2128,2 1 '040 (White, J „ dissenting).
'" Id, at 2132 (White, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 2131 (White, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
156 1d. at 2123.
157 Id, at 2113,
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four mandatory regulations and their narrow reading of the evidence concerning dis-
crimination against handicapped infants.L"
The Bowen decision does not decide the ultimate question of whether section 504
can ever apply to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants. The plurality's
decision to consider only the mandatory sections of the Final Rules not only leaves open
the possibility that other regulations under section 504 might be upheld but it also leaves
intact the nonmandatory recommendations contained in the Final Rules.'" It is thus
unclear whether Bowen or the prior lower court decisions have settled the question of
federal involvement in the treatment of handicapped infants under section 504's non-
discrimination mandate.
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S SECOND RESPONSE - THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984
In another federal government response to the Indiana Baby Doe case, Congress
began in 1982 to consider amending the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act to
include provisions dealing with medical treatment decisions for handicapped new-
borns.' 6° The Child Abuse Amendments, enacted in 1984, constitute another federal
attempt to influence treatment decisions for severely handicapped newborns.' 6 ' The
Child Abuse Amendments, however, place the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that
these infants are not neglected medically, in the hands of state child protective services
agencies rather than in the hands of any federal agency. 162
In the Child Abuse Amendments, Congress added the term "withholding of medi-
cally indicated treatment" to the existing statutory definition of child neglect."' The
amendments provide, in substance, that failure to treat all of an infant's correctable life-
threatening conditions constitutes neglect except in three specific instances." The three
exceptions include those cases where, in the physician's "reasonable medical judgment,"
the infant is irreversibly comatose, the treatment would be futile in saving the infant's
life, or the treatment would be virtually futile and therefore inhumane. 165
"8 See id. at 2124, 2128-30 (White, J., dissenting).
159 See id. at 2106 & n.4 (describing 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.55(a), (f) (1986)). See supra note 125 for a
description of the recommendations contained in the Final Rules.
'"" See Treatment of Infants Born with Handicapping Conditions: Hearing on H.R. 6492 Before the
Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982)
(opening statement of Austin J. Murphy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Select Education).
wi 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
162 Id. 5103(b)(2)(K) (Stipp. III 1985).
"'5 Id. § 5102(3) (Supp. III 1985). The definition of child abuse and neglect also includes physical
or mental injury, sexual abuse and negligent treatment. Id. § 5102(1) (Supp. I11 1985).
' 64 See id. § 5102(3) (Supp. III 1985).
'"' Id. The amendments provide that:
the term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" means the failure to respond
to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appro-
priate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician's or
physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ame-
liorating or correcting all such conditions, except that the term does not include the
failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medi-
cation) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical
judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of
such treatment would (i) merely prolong dying. (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise he futile in
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The amendments require the states to ensure that hospitals report cases of suspected
medical neglect to state child protective services agencies. 166
 The amendments also make
these state agencies responsible for implementing procedures to respond to reports that
parents or doctors are withholding medically indicated treatment from an infant. 167 In
addition, states must grant state child protective services agencies authority to bring suit
to ensure that medically indicated treatment is not withheld.' 68 The amendments further
authorize HHS to issue regulations and to provide funding to help implement these new
requirements.' 69
On April 15, 1985, HHS issued Final Rules implementing the Child Abuse Amend-
ments (the CAA Rules).'" In the CAA Rules, HHS provided that these regulations
should not be construed to affect any regulation issued under section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act."' This provision reflected congressional and HHS policy to remain neutral
in the Bowen litigation involving section 504, which was then pending before the Supreme
Court.I 72
In its discussion of the CAA Rules, HHS recognized the general similarity of purpose
underlying the regulations it proposed under both section 504 and the Child Abuse
terms of the survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be
virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under
such circumstances would be inhumane.
Id. § 5102(3) (Supp. 111 1985).
11 '' Id. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(ii).
167 Id. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(i)•
168 Id. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(iii). Congress ensures state enforcement of the amendments by condi-
tioning federal grant money for state child abuse programs on states' implementing these proce-
dures within one year of the amendments' enactment date. Id. § 5103(b)(2)(K). This section of the
statute provides:
(2) In order for a State to qualify for assistance under this subsection, such State
shall —
(K) within one year after 'the date of the enactment of the Child Abuse Amend-
ments of 19841, have in place for the purpose of responding to the reporting of
medical neglect (including instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment
From disabled infants with life-threatening conditions), procedures or programs, or
both (within the State child protective services system), to provide for (i) coordination
and consultation with individuals designated by and within appropriate health-care
facilities, (ii) prompt notification by individuals designated by and within appropriate
health-care facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect (including instances of
withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threat-
ening conditions), and (iii) authority, under Slate law, fur the State child protective
service system ti pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, as may be necessary to prevent the
withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threat-
ening conditions.
Id. § 5103(b)(2).
I"" See id. 5103 note (Supp. II1 1 4,185) (Procedures and Programs fur Responding to Reports
of Medical Neglect).
"" Ste 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340. After Congress enacted the amendments, 1-111S issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160 (1984) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). After receiving over
116,000 comments on its Proposed Rules, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,879 (1985), FIFIS issued the
CAA Rules in 1985. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1985).
171 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(e)(1) (1986). The CAA Rules also provide that they are riot to be
construed to create any requirement for specific medical treatment l'or particular medical conditions.
Id. § 1340.15(e)(2).
"2 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,885 (1985).
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Amendments: to assure the provision of medically indicated treattnent to disabled infants
within the bounds of reasonable medical judgment.'" HHS expressed the hope that if
the government prevailed in the section 504 litigation, HHS would be able to coordinate
the two sets of regulations to achieve their common purpose.'" While the CAA Rules
rely on state agencies for enforcement, HHS commented, the section 504 regulations
provide the additional benefit of a direct federal enforcement mechanism.'"
In promulgating the CAA Rules, HHS made several general comments regarding
the application of the Child Abuse Amendments to medical treatment decisionmaking
for infants.' 76
 In response to requests for clarification by those commenting on the
proposed CAA rules, HHS stated unequivocally that parents and their doctors, "except
in highly unusual circumstances," are responsible for making medical treatment deci-
sions.'" HHS emphasized, however, that such decisions should not be based on the
anticipated quality of life of the handicapped infant.'" HHS anticipated that when a
state child protective services agency receives a report of suspected medical neglect, the
'75
	 In issuing the CAA Rules, HHS stated that it attempted to preserve the Child Abuse
Amendments' carefully constructed compromise between competing concerns: the need to prevent
unnecessary interference in medical and parental decisionmaking on the one hand, and the need
to protect disabled infants from unreasonable decisions not to provide treatment on the other. Id.
at 14,879. The CAA Rules' definitional terms, therefore, either reflect the language of the amend-
ments themselves or derive from their legislative history. See id. at 14,880, 14,881. In its Proposed
Rule, HHS had specifically defined the terms contained in the amendments' new provision regarding
"withholding of medically indicated treatment." 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160, 48,166-48,167 (1984) (pro-
posed Dec. 10, 1984) (defining the terms "life-threatening condition," "treatment," "merely prolong
dying," "not be effective m ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions,"
"virtually futile," ''the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane"). HI-IS re-
moved these definitions from the text of the CAA Rules in response to comments from medical
organizations which criticized the inclusion of rigid definitions as part of the Rules. 50 Fed. Reg.
14,878, 14,880 (1985). Because HHS wanted to inform health care professionals of its interpretation
of these key terms, however, NHS included the definitions in an appendix to the CAA Rules. 45
C.F.R. pt. 1340, app. C (1986).
In addition to the requirements the amendments impose on states, see supra note 168, the CAA
Rules require states to have documented programs and procedures in place which show that the
child protective services system has a contact at each health care facility with whom the agency will
coordinate its activities. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(3) (1986). The procedures must specify how the
agencies, consistent with state law, will obtain medical records and a court order For an independent
medical examination of the infant when necessary in investigating reported instances of medical
neglect. Id. § 1340.15(c)(4) (1986).
17' 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,885 (1985).
3751d.
176 See id. at 14,880-14,881. HHS commented that the Child Abuse Amendments had developed
out of cooperation among many medical and disability advocacy organizations. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160,
48,160 (1984) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
The American Medical Association (AMA), however, opposed the Child Abuse Amendments.
Treatment of Infants Born with Handicapping Conditions: Hearings on H.R. 6492 Before the Subcomm. on
Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 56-58 (1982)
(statement of the American Medical Association) [hereinafter, Statement of the AMA]. See infra
note 234 for a discussion of the AMA's position.
'" 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,880 (1985).
178 Id. The AMA, however, has expressed the contrary view: "[q]uality of life is a factor to be
considered in determining what is best for the individual." Statement of the AMA, supra note 176,
at 57.
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agency, in conjunction with the hospital, should provide all available information to the
parents and work with them in making their decision. 179
HHS also commented on the CAA Rules' potential economic impact on state child
protective services agencies.'" The impact would not be too burdensome, Fl HS believed,
because although the aggregate costs of treating infants with severe birth defects might
be significant, HHS felt that it was customary even before the amendments' passage to
provide aggressive and costly treatment for such infants.'" Thus, HHS believed that the
amendments and regulations would influence treatment decisions in only a "very small
fraction" of cases.'" NHS acknowledged that the possibility of legal action might cause
inhumane defensive treatment practices, such as trying to treat infants whose death is
inevitable, but found that the statute's reliance on reasonable medical judgment would
protect against inappropriate treatment decisions.'"
In summary, the Child Abuse Amendments and the CAA Rules issued thereunder
emphasize the role of the states in dealing with the perceived problem of parents, doctors,
and hospitals intentionally withholding life-saving medical treatment from handicapped
infants. Although the amendments do provide a new definition of medical neglect which
emphasizes the federal government's commitment. to providing treatment to all infants
except in extreme cases,'" the amendments do not give the federal government a direct
role in overseeing individual treatment decisions. Rather, the federal government's role
under the Child Abuse Amendments currently is limited to threatening to withdraw
federal funds in order to motivate state agencies to ensure that handicapped infants
receive adequate medical care.'"
While the Bowen decision and the Child Abuse Amendments presently do not appear
to give the federal government an active role in individual treatment decisions, the
potential for federal intervention still exists both under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act and under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. The Bowen plurality
specifically did not decide whether section 504 could ever apply to medical treatment
decisions for handicapped infants.L 86
 Furthermore, under the Child Abuse Amendments,
' 79 50 Fed, Reg. 14,878, 14,880 (1985).
Id. at 14,886.
L8I Id. HHS also pointed out that health insurance pays for health care for most infants. Id.
L82 Id. HHS stated:
In some unknown but very small fraction of infants, medically indicated treatment
may have been or would have been withheld but for the response to the "Baby Doe"
cases (including not only the law and this rule, but also public awareness and prior
rules). However, the great majority of expensive interventions would occur — and are
already occurring at annual costs in the range of several billion dollars — regardless
of this change.
Id.
Regarding the economic impact of the new procedural and administrative costs to state child
protective services agencies, HHS commented that Congress intended the states to implement the
new requirements through existing child protective services systems. Id. at 14,883. Because the
systems are in place already, and because HHS increased the federal grants to states in order to
offset the costs of implementing the new requirements, 1-111S felt that the economic impact on state
agencies would not be unmanageable. Id. at 14,887.
' 99
 Id, at 14,886.
1 " See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5102, 5103 (Stipp. III 1985).
185 See id. § 5103 (Supp. III 1985).
I"Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2111.
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HHS is authorized to issue regulations to implement the new state requirements and
thus can influence what the states must do to comply with the amendments. 187 Thus the
extent to which the federal government can still influence medical treatment decisions
for handicapped infants is still uncertain, as is the question of whether it should exercise
that influence.
IV. POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE FEDERAL ROLE IN TREATMENT DECISIONS FOR HANDICAPPED
INFANTS
Six years after the Indiana Baby Doe case, two related questions remain unanswered:
first, to what extent can the federal government still influence these treatment decisions
either under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or under the Child Abuse Amend-
ments; and second, to what extent should the federal government exercise this influence.
The courts' treatment of the section 504 regulations and the history of the Child Abuse
Amendments, however, both argue against an increased role for the federal government
in the decisionmaking process. That process is best left in the hands of the infant's
parents and doctors.
A. Possibility of Future Federal Government Involvement
The federal government first sought to play a role in medical treatment decisions
for severely disabled infants under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits
discrimination based on handicap.'" Courts uniformly defeated HHS's repeated at-
tempts to regulate individual treatment decisions under section 504. 189
 The courts pri-
marily were concerned with HHS's failure to demonstrate a need for regulations which
authorize federal officials to intervene in individual cases to ascertain whether nontreat-
ment decisions complied with section 504. 199 Because section 504 merely prohibits recip-
ients of federal financial assistance from discriminating against handicapped individu-
als,' 9 ' section 504 is not the appropriate vehicle for an HHS campaign to save the lives
of all handicapped infants, regardless of how nonhandicapped infants are treated.
In order for HHS to promulgate any regulations under section 504, it would have
to gather factual support showing that recipients of federal financial assistance make
different treatment decisions for handicapped versus nonhandicapped infants. 192 The
dissent in Bowen argued that the influence that doctors, nurses, and other hospital
personnel have on parents as they deliberate about whether to consent to treatment for
their handicapped infant may violate section 504. 1 " As the Bowen dissent contended, if
hospital personnel influence parents not to treat a medically correctable condition for a
handicapped infant, but advocate treating the same condition for a nonhandicapped
'" 42 U.S.C. § 5103 note (Supp. 111 1985) (Procedures and Programs for Responding to Reports
of Medical Neglect).
'" 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1622-23 (1984).
' 99 See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2123; American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp.
395, 404 (D.1).C. 1983).
19° See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2122; American Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F, Supp. at 399. See also
University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 161.
' 9 ' Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2123.
92 See ,supra text accompanying notes 136-143.
99
 Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting).
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infant, then discrimination is shown and would provide a basis for HHS to intervene
under section 504. 164
While this argument appears plausible at first glance, it is flawed in at least two
respects. First, it assumes that an infant's multiple handicaps are unrelated and therefore
can be medically evaluated as separate problems.'" As the University Hospital court
suggested, however, it is often impossible to consider an infant's multiple impairments
separately when deciding on the best course of medical treatment."6 Thus, the existence
of one handicap may create new risks in treating a second, correctable condition, or may
decrease the likelihood that the treatment will be successful.
Second, even if it were possible to show in some cases that an infant's multiple
handicaps are unrelated when deciding whether treatment will be beneficial, 1} 7 it is the
parents who decide whether to consent to the treatment. 136 A parental decision not to
consent to treatment does not violate , section 504 because section 504 only prohibits
discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally funded programs."" Therefore,
even if a health care professional's discriminatory attitude towards handicapped infants
influences the parents, section 504 does not cover the parental decision not to provide
medical treatment and thus does not support federal intervention under the Rehabili-
tation ACt . 29G
Moreover, although HE-IS cited several studies that indicate that doctors often dis-
criminatorily influence these decisions, 261 this evidence does not support section 504's
application in this area because section 504 does not cover the parents' decision regarding
medical treatment for their infant. 202 As the Bowen plurality indicated, section 504 does
not prohibit health care professionals from giving advice to parents who are not covered
by section 504.2" In fact, the Bowen plurality observed, such a prohibition would violate
the constitutional doctrine of free speech, 204
The courts' uniform rejection of the section 504 regulations demonstrates their
decided hostility towards using section 504 to implement such intrusive measures as
hotlines and investigative "Baby Doe squads" without better evidence that federal inter-
vention is necessary in an area previously governed by state law. 2" The dissenting judge
in University Hospital argued that because section 504's language mirrored that of the
civil rights statutes, this indicated a congressional intent to apply section 504 broadly to
combat discrimination against the handicapped. 2" As the Bowen plurality observed,
however, section 504's language does not support a mandate for federal agencies to
194 Id.
195 See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-57.
191i See id.
1 "7 See Bowen, 106 S. Cc at 2127 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying
text.
L", Even the dissent in Bowen recognized that it is "the parental decision to consent or not [that]
is obviously the critical one." Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2129 (White, J., dissenting).
1" 49 Fed. Reg, 1622, 1631 (1984).
2110 See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2117 n.22.
2°' See 48 Fed, Reg, 30,846, 30,847-30,848 (1983) (proposed July 5, 1983). See also Bowen, 106
S. Cc at 2129 (White, J., dissenting).
2112 See 49 Fed, Reg. 1622, 1631 (1989).
2°' See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2117 n.22.
204 Id.
295 See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 160 (2d Cir. 1984).
206 Id. at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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require that handicapped infants receive special services not applicable to nonhandi-
capped infants.207 Because Congress did not expressly indicate that section 504 should
apply to medical treatment decisions previously governed by state law, 206 and because
Congress has not amended the Rehabilitation Act to clarify whether it should apply to
these treatment decisions, HHS must present more compelling evidence than it has done
of discriminatory treatment of handicapped infants to justify the kind of federal inter-
vention which the Final Rules contemplated.
Although the Bowen decision clearly stated that section 504 does not authorize the
federal intervention into individual treatment decisions that the Final Rules contem-
plated, the decision is ambiguous concerning what sort of federal intervention the statute
does authorize. 209 Bowen's plurality opinion was extremely narrow, addressing only the
four mandatory provisions of the section 504 Final Rules."' Thus, HHS still may be
able to influence medical treatment decisions and encourage nondiscriminatory provision
of health care to handicapped infants by implementing further nonmandatory recom-
mendations under section 504. To the extent that such recommendations focus on
equality of treatment for handicapped and nonhandicapped infants in federally funded
programs, and to the extent that they do not ignore the states' traditional role in
protecting all children, it is unlikely that such recommendations would encounter the
same objections from medical groups and the courts.
Although HHS retains some authority to regulate medical treatment decisions under
section 504 after Bowen, the Child Abuse Amendments provide a better framework for
effecting the goal of ensuring that handicapped infants receive adequate medical care. 21'
Through the Child Abuse Amendments, Congress stated that medical treatment must
be provided unless it would be virtually futile in saving the infant's life. 212 Although the
amendments' procedural requirements make the states responsible for enforcing the
new provisions regarding withholding medical treatment from handicapped infants ,2I3
the amendments also authorize HHS to regulate implementation of these new state
requirements. 214 Thus, HHS has some power to influence treatment decisions through
its role in determining what state actions constitute compliance with the amendments.
Although HI-IS potentially can influence the way states enforce the Child Abuse
Amendments, it has thus far declined to do anything which might upset the amendment's
"careful balance between the need to establish effective protection of the rights of
disabled infants and the need to avoid unreasonable governmental intervention into the
practice of medicine and parental responsibilities." 215 In its proposed version of the CAA
Rules, for example, HHS had specifically defined several key terms within the statute's
definition of "withholding of medically indicated treatment." 216 After receiving a great
2°7
	 Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2120 & n.28.
208 See id. at 2121. The plurality noted that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance." Id. at 2121 n.33 (quoting
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
265 See id. at 2132 (White, J., dissenting).
210 See id. at 2106 & 11.4.
211 42
	
§§ 5101-5103 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
214 Id. § 5102(3) (Supp. III 1985).
213
	 § 5103(b)(2)(K).
214 Id. § 5103 note (Supp. III 1985) (Procedures and Programs for Responding to Reports of
Medical Neglect).
2 ' 5 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,879 (1985).
216 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160, 48,166-48,167 (1984) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
May 1988j	 MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISIONS	 739
deal of criticism about including rigid definitions of medical neglect in the mandatory
regulations, however, HHS moved these definitions to an Appendix to the CAA Rules. 212
As a result of this restructuring, the CAA Rules implement only procedural requirements
that direct the states to ensure that they have adequate mechanisms in place to respond
to reports of medical neglect. 218 The CAA Rules thus do not go beyond the Child Abuse
Amendments themselves in defining when medical treatment is inappropriately with-
held. 2 ' 9 Nevertheless, HHS retains the authority to change its position on this issue if it
sees a need to do so, as well as to implement other regulations determining what states
must do to comply with the Child Abuse Amendments.
B. Desirability of Future Federal Government Involvement
Given that HHS retains some authority to further regulate treatment decisions for
handicapped infants under both section 504 and the Child Abuse Amendments, the
question becomes whether it is necessary, practical, or desirable for HHS or Congress to
do so. Currently, because Bowen invalidated the mandatory section 504 regulations, HHS
does not have an active role in individual treatment decisions for handicapped infants.
HHS has emphasized, however, that treatment decisions are the responsibility of the
infant's parents and doctors "except in highly unusual circumstances." 22" It is only in
exceptional cases, therefore, that the current scheme envisions even state involvement,
Moreover, HI-ES has acknowledged that the regulations already in place will not
affect a great number of individual treatment decisions. 221 H HS estimated that of the
two and one half percent of births that involve serious medical problems, federal action
under section 504 and the Child Abuse Amendments would influence treatment deci-
sions in only a "very small fraction" of cases, 222 Because HI-iS views the parents as the
primary decisionmakers, with state agencies and courts available to correct inappropriate
decisions that may occur in these few cases, increased federal involvement is both
unwarranted and unnecessary.22 '
HHS had expressed the hope, before the Bowen decision was announced, that the
section 504 regulations and those promulgated under the Child Abuse Amendments
would complement one another in working toward the goal of ensuring proper medical
care to disabled infants, 224 Perhaps HHS believed it advantageous to have a federal
enforcement mechanism in addition to a state enforcement mechanism to foster uni-
2 0
 50 Fed, Reg. 14,878, 14,880 (1985). See 45 C.E.R. pt. 1340 app. C (1986).
218 See 45 C.F.R.	 1390.15 (1986).
219 See 50 Fed, Reg. 14,878, 14,880 (1985).
22" See id.
271 See id. at 14,886-14,887.
222 Id. at 14,886.
225 Not only is increased federal intervention unwarranted, but as one commentator has asked:
[H]ow did it come to pass that the Reagan Administration, elected under the banner
"Get the Government Off' our Backs," proposed the Baby Doe Hotline, and has gone
to the wall to protect the rights of handicapped newborns with the one hand, while
reducing maternal and child health appropriations with the other?
Meyer, supra note 11, at 627. II' the government is going to interfere in the parents' treatment
decision for their child, then the government must be responsible to some degree, both financially
and physically, for helping to care for that child. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 689-90. See also
Mathieu, supra note 11, at 610, 625.
224 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,885 (1985). See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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formity regarding when decisions not to treat might be appropriate. It is likely, however,
that uniform standards are neither possible nor desirable in the context of medical
treatment decisions for handicapped infants.
The promotion of uniform standards for decisionmaking implies that there is some
medical or societal consensus regarding how to decide when it is appropriate to withhold
treatment from a seriously handicapped infant.225 Even medical and ethics experts,
however, do not agree on the appropriate response to the dilemmas posed by these
infants.226 Some commentators believe that legislation is needed to provide guidance to
doctors and parents regarding what actions society accepts so that parents need riot be
forced into the courts for answers. 227 Other commentators, however, recognize that all
medical treatment decisions are based on complex medical variables with unpredictable
outcomes and believe that legislation, by its very nature, is unable to address all the
subtleties involved in these difficult decisions. 228
Against this background of conflicting views, the federal government attempted to
impose uniform standards on medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants. 229
Yet in the two highly publicized Baby Doe cases which fueled the federal government's
actions, the highest courts which heard the cases, as well as the respective state child
protective services agencies, ratified the parents' decision in each case. 2" Therefore,
although the federal government appears to have objected to the parents' treatment
decisions in these cases, the state agencies and courts which investigated the allegations
of unlawful medical neglect found the parents' decisions to be reasonable. 2" This incon-
gruity is not surprising in light of the lack of any medical or societal consensus concerning
the correct treatment decision under any given set of medical facts.
Given the difficulty of the medical determinations and the variety and severity of
medical conditions that may be involved in each individual case, the Child Abuse Amend-
ments' general reliance on reasonable medical judgment may be as specific and appro-
priate a standard as any legislature can enact. 252 Although medical organizations led the
fight against EIHS's mandatory regulations under section 504, 222 many medical groups
225 See generally Mnookin, supra note 33, at 677-81 (describing the disagreement among ethicists
concerning the proper approach to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants). See also
R.F. WEIR, supra note 2, at 59; Ellis, supra note 33, at 412.
22" See, e.g., R.F. WE/R, supra note 2, at 59-90 (describing views of seven pediatricians); id. at
143-87 (describing five approaches taken by ethicists).
227 See Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20
HAIM J. ON LEGIS. 137, 148 (1983); Ellis, supra note :33, at 413-18.
228 R.F. Went, supra note 2, at 139; Mathieu, supra note 11, at 624.
229 The government attempted first to investigate and judge individual treatment decisions
under § 504, 45 C, F.R. § 84.55 (1986), and, when this failed, to impose uniform standards for
withholding treatment under the Child Abuse Amendments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5103 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
23" See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1984); See R.F. WEIR, supra
note 2, at 128-29 (describing the Indiana Baby Doe case).
231 See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147; R.F. WEitt, supra note 2, at 128-29 (describing the
Indiana Baby Doc case).
292
	 generally Burt, The Treatment of Handicapped Newborns: Is There a Role for Law?, 1 ISSUES
IN L. & MED. 279, 281-283 (1986).
2" See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986); American Academy of Pediatrics
v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (1983).
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supported the Child Abuse Amendments.'" The explanation lies in the careful drafting
of the amendments.
The amendments establish a broad policy that medical treatment should be provided
to seriously handicapped infants except when it will be futile or inhumane.'" Whether
the exceptions apply to treatment in a specific case depends on the reasonable medical
judgment of the health care profeSsionals involved. The scope of the exceptions, there-
fore, is subject to the individual physician's interpretation of the medical risks and
benefits in each case. Thus, health care professionals supported the amendments because
the reasonable medical judgment standard allows them to maintain the flexibility they
need when deciding how to advise parents about treatment for their handicapped
infants.236 Health care professionals need this flexibility in order to respond appropriately
to the "myriad of real-life problems in intensive care nurseries," 237 even though the result
reached in any one case might vary depending on the decisionmaker's assessment of the
medical risks and benefits involved.
The federal government's responses to the Indiana Baby Doe case, while they did
not ultimately alter the federal role in individual treatment decisions significantly, served
instead to publicize the issues and possibly make nontreatment decisions less likely to
occur. 238 HHS's recommendations to form Infant Care Review Committees, the Child
Abuse Amendments' requirements regarding state action, and perhaps most significantly,
the public attention that has been generated, all serve to minimize the likelihood that
decisions to withhold treatment from a handicapped infant will be made without careful
consideration of the possible legal consequences.'" While such considerations may help
some parents in reaching a decision, it also seems clear that the parents' decision will be
depersonalized and that parents will haYe to be constantly looking over their shoulders
fearing interference from someone who disagrees with the course of treatment they
have chosen.
Perhaps, in the face of the public outcry over the Indiana Baby Doe case, the
government's efforts to formulate a federal standard constituted an important statement
affirming a nondiscriminatory commitment to life for all infants, disabled or not. If it
was desirable for the federal government to respond to the Indiana Baby Doe case in
order to clarify its positions, however, it was also desirable that the federal government's
efforts in the end amounted to very little substantive change. The government's response
left intact the framework that makes parents, doctors, and state agencies, in that order,
responsible for making these difficult decisions, but it publicized both the weaknesses in
that framework and established review methods for when decisions improperly are based
on concerns about the infant's future handicaps.
24 See 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160, 48,160 (1984) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). But see Statement of the
AMA„ supra mtte 208, at 57 (AMA opposed ante in ling the Child Abuse Prevention anti Treatment.
Act because it would "substitute a statutory prohibition for the case-by-case medical judgment of
the attending physician and the judgment of the parents").
255 42 U.S.C. § 5102(3) (Supp. 111 1985).
256 See 50 Fed. keg. 14,878, 14,879 (1985).
257 Id.
'" See id. at 14,886.
2" In fact, some commentators have criticized the federal response to the Baby Doe problem
because it could lead to overtreabnerd in futile cases as doctors practice defensive medicine. Meyer,
supra note 1 l, at 634. Bali see 50 Fed. keg. 14,878, 14,886 (1985) (H HS commenting that the Child
Abuse Amendments' reliance on "reasonable medical judgment" protects against overtreatment).
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CONCLUSION
In 1982, the Indiana Baby Doe case focused the attention of the media, the public,
the President, the Department of Health and Human Services, and ultimately Congress
on the problem of withholding medical treatment from seriously handicapped infants.
HHS responded to the Baby Doe case by attempting to issue regulations which authorized
HI-IS officials to investigate individual cases of suspected medical neglect under the
nondiscrimination provisions of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Courts repeatedly
struck down these regulations, finding no clear showing that federal intervention was
necessary in this area. Congress responded to the Baby Doe problem with the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984, which require that states, not the federal government,
institute procedures to respond to reports of nontreatment of handicapped infants.
Thus, the federal government's responses to the Baby Doe problem did not result in
any significant change in the federal government's role in individual cases of suspected
medical neglect.
While HHS retains some general power to influence medical treatment decisions
under both section 504 and the Child Abuse Amendments, the history of the section
504 regulations in the courts, and the implementation of the Child Abuse Amendments
demonstrate that an intrusive federal government role in individual treatment decisions
is unwarranted. The impossibility of formulating uniform treatment standards, the rarity
of cases where treatment is inappropriately withheld, and the existence of state agencies
and courts to handle the cases that do occur all indicate that the federal government has
no role in medical treatment decisionmaking for handicapped infants. As a result of the
federal government's actions, courts and Congress affirmed that these decisions are
appropriately left to the infant's parents, guided by reasonable medical judgment, and,
only in exceptional cases will state agencies and courts review these decisions.
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